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A growing percentage of public political communication takes place on
social media sites such as Twitter, and not all of it is posted by humans.
If citizens are to have the final say online, we must be able to detect and
weed out bot accounts. The objective of this thesis is threefold: 1) ex-
pand the pool of Twitter election data available for analysis, 2) evaluate
the bot detection performance of humans on a ground-truth dataset, and
3) learn what features humans associate with accounts that they believe
to be bots. In this thesis, we build a large database of over 120 million
tweets from over 900,000 Twitter accounts that tweeted about political
candidates running for US Senate during the 2018 American Midterm
Elections. Tweet-level data were collected in real-time during the two-
month period surrounding the elections; account-level data were collected
retrospectively in the months following the elections. Using this original
dataset, we design and launch a bot detection study using a novel combi-
nation of Amazon SageMaker and Qualtrics. For ground truth, we include
39 known bot accounts from a separate 2015 Bot Challenge Dataset (BCD
2015) in the study sample. Of the 39 known bots from BCD 2015, only 11
accounts (28.2%) were accurately identified as bots with a two-thirds or
unanimous annotator vote; just 5 accounts (12.8%) were unanimously ac-
curately identified as bots, highlighting the difficulty of building accurate
training sets for bot detection. Looking at the study results for the Senate
dataset accounts, we observe that accounts which 1) post frequently and
2) retweet frequently were more likely to be labeled as bots. The Senate
dataset and the associated study results offer significant opportunities for
further analysis and research.
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Free and fair elections form the foundation of a well-functioning democracy. In today’s
networked age, political messages travel rapidly around the world with just a few
clicks, disrupting traditional top-down mass media. Now, anyone, or anything, can
reach millions of users.
In the aftermath of the 2016 election, computer and social scientists alike both
sought to understand precisely what happened during the election, and to what extent
outside actors managed to influence the conversation online. Rather than add to
politicized existing literature, we decided to pursue original research on a new set
of elections, the 2018 Midterms, as they happened in real-time. We picked the 35
elections for US Senate in particular because they represented a specific, manageable
subset of races to gather data on. Then, using our dataset, we crowdsource human
judgements regarding whether or not Twitter accounts are controlled by humans or
by bots.
An ancillary motivation for this work is to improve tooling and resources for anal-
ysis. The state of the art for social scientists up to this point has generally been
to upload CSVs to Amazon Mechanical Turk or comparable platforms, but manual
CSV uploads are fairly limited, especially in terms of the amount of data that can
realistically fit on a single row. From the computer science side, researchers com-
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monly use human annotators (coders, in political science terms) to build training
datasets for machine learning problems, but those training datasets are typically of
fairly simple and concrete things – detecting dogs versus cats, as a simple example.
Bot detection is a far more difficult challenge, especially because labeling is prone to
bias. With bot detection, our novel contribution has been to work to combine social
science methodology (collecting demographic data, carefully designing an interven-
tion to minimize bias) with more advanced tooling used to develop machine learning
datasets. Bot detection is especially difficult because we almost always lack ground
truth. A final theme and motivation throughout this work is constant care to avoid
making unwarranted assumptions about what is or is not a bot account. On the
Senate dataset, we lack ground-truth, so we must not get carried away with grand
claims. This dataset is not a random sample of Twitter generally, and thus the results
here may not generalize beyond this particular selection of Twitter accounts. Caveats
aside, we can say a few interesting things about what people think bots are, because
accounts with certain attributes were indeed more likely to be perceived to be bots.
Of course, we do not know for certain if they actually are bots; we only know that a
sample of humans thought they were bots.
1.2 Related Work
We began by studying the literature, looking for prior examples of bot detection,
large-scale data collection, and large-scale crowdsourcing. First, in terms of bot
detection, researchers clustered around Indiana University, including E. Ferrara, A.
Flammini, and F. Menczer, have built an interesting bot detection service (https:
//botometer.iuni.iu.edu/) as part of their broader Observatory on Social Media
(OSoMe) research project https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/. For more information on
their bot detection research, refer to [1] and the more-recent [2]. E. Ferrara, A.
Flammini, and F. Menczer were also involved with the 2015 Twitter bot challenge
[3]. We use the known bot accounts from the Twitter bot challenge dataset (referred
to in this paper as BCD 2015) as ground truth in this thesis. Refer to section 2.2.3
2
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for more information about how we use BCD 2015.
The same group of researchers, Ferrara et al. (2016) offer a review of recent litera-
ture discussing social bots [4]. In reviewing the history of known bot campaigns, they
refer back to the 2010 midterm elections, and they discuss how bots were employed to
boost some candidates and harm others. They propose a taxonomy of bot detection
systems: (none of these are mutually exclusive):
1. social network information
2. human intelligence and crowdsourcing
3. machine learning
Twitter rate limits make it relatively difficult to get graph network information
from Twitter’s API (follower and followee lists in particular are locked down, for
good reasons), which makes it difficult to get the necessary data to run a classifier
using network-based features. “Human Intelligence and Crowdsourcing” is the second
general approach on their taxonomy, and it is the primary approach used here in
this paper. Before building a model, the third item on their list, it’s important to
understand and have good, accurate training data – supervised machine learning
models are only as good as the quality of the training data which is input. We will
attempt ML in future work. Finally, the paper observes that the bot landscape is
constantly changing [4].
Because Twitter data collection is a relatively low-barrier data source, many
groups, private and public, have done large-scale data collection. From the published
literature, T. Finin et al. (2010) builds a nice system to crowdsource named entity
recognition [5]. In their paper, they weigh the trade-offs between Amazon Mechanical
Turk and CrowdFlower (now rebranded as FigureEight). In 2010, CrowdFlower was
likely the best tool available; now Amazon SageMaker offers a compelling alternative
choice, and SageMaker is the tool used in the present work. Finin et al. discusses the
use of a ‘gold standard dataset’, which they use to monitor annotator performance
and enforce standards. In their case, because named entity recognition is a right-
or-wrong task, you’re either correct or incorrect, and an outside observer can indeed
3
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verify that a particular result is correct, the golden dataset approach makes sense –
annotators that perform below par on a known task can be removed from the study.
Whereas in this study, because we don’t fundamentally know which Senate accounts
are or are not bots, we avoid removing any annotators from our labeling pool. We
do, however, track and associate all responses with demographic data, so subsequent
cohort analysis will be possible.
Chu et al. (2010) discusses the design and implementation a multi-class classifier
capable of detecting human, bot, and cyborg accounts. The work broadens the tra-
ditional bot-human binary classification, pushing back on an assumed binary that an
account is either a bot or a human [6]. Chu’s work serves as an inspiration for why,
in the present work, we require that annotators who indicate that an account is a bot
also provide a bot subtype, if they end up analyzing an account which they believe
to truly be a bot. Interesting future work would be to include ‘cyborg’ as an option
for annotators.
Cohen and Ruths (2013) ask the question: do political orientation classifiers per-
form as well as their authors claim they do, especially on less-polar Twitter accounts
[7]? The authors find that many political orientation classifiers do not generalize
beyond their narrow sample of tweets or accounts that they were trained on; a cau-
tionary tale with regard to overly-optimistic estimates of model quality. In their work,
they test several political orientation classifiers on two sets of accounts: 1) politicians
and 2) ‘normal’ users who rarely discuss politics, and finds that inference accuracy
on normal users is far below what some researchers have claimed in their published
results [7]. Skewed training data degrades classifier performance and limits gener-
alizability. Thus, the focus here has been on building a system to reliably collect
good data, first, rather than rushing to build a model on data that we do not fully
understand. The relevance of this for this paper is that, while it is tempting to build
a bot detection model straight away, there first are many important questions that we




The following are guiding questions we used to structure our research:
1. What did the 2018 Senate Elections look like on Twitter?
2. How good are humans at detecting bots?
• What are bots?
• How do we know if an account is a bot?
• How will we show people Twitter accounts?
3. What makes people think that certain accounts are controlled by bots, but not
others?
We will return to these questions throughout this paper.
1.4 2018 Elections for US Senate
The 2018 American Midterm Elections took place on November 6, 2018. There were
a total of 35 Senate races: 33 regular races and 2 special elections.
The MIT Election Lab hosts a great repository of datasets with election data for
the curious; you can find election statistics, including 2018 Midterm data, on the MIT
Election Lab Website [8].
1.5 State of the Art: Building Datasets for Ma-
chine Learning
A number of tools and services exist with the purpose of building training datasets.
Within large tech companies, in-house labeling pipelines are commonplace and
are integrated into complex internal workflows.
Amazon Mechanical Turk remains the leading human-tasks platform, although
there are many new competitors. The platform was not built from the ground up
5
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Figure 1.1 MTurk Standard Labeling Interface for Object Detection [11]
to serve as a ML labeling tool per se, although it also functions quite well for ML
labeling. Other, newer alternatives are designed from the ground-up for ML labeling,
including FigureEight, LabelBox, and many others.
Prodigy is a relatively new entrant [9]. It uses active learning to reduce the
number of annotations necessary to train a supervised learning classifer. It is strong
as a data exploration tool for data scientists. Because it does not (yet) support
multiple annotators per object out of the box, it is not as well suited for tasks that
are prone to bias, such as this bot research.
SageMaker Ground Truth is a new service from Amazon Web Services which is
useful for building datasets for machine learning [10]. You can run SageMaker labeling
jobs on three types of workforces: 1) on Amazon Mechanical Turk, with a 3rd party
vendor or 3) with your own team.
SageMaker Ground Truth is quite generalizable – you can add annotations to just
about any type of data that you can save to Amazon S3. Several stock annotation
templates are provided out-of-the box; for more complex annotation tasks, such as
the present task, they provide the option to build-your-own labeling task using your
own HTML+CSS+Javascript.
Bias in machine learning is a major concern; see, for example, Dressel’s thesis
6
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Figure 1.2 For this research, we implemented a custom bot detection task using
AWS SageMaker
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work analyzing racial bias in a recidivism algorithm [12]. Bias from the training set
is perpetuated with the model, so catching the bias in the dataset from the very start
is an important task.
1.6 Data Science Ethics
This research involves over a terabyte of text data, and it is important that we are
careful stewards of it. For this research, we received all necessary approvals – we
received IRB approval (Exempt – Category 2) and department approval. All data
downloaded was via an authorized Twitter Developer Account at the free-tier public
level. No scraping was involved – scraping is potentially a violation of Twitter’s
terms of service. All tweets were archived from public accounts. If we ever make any
of the dataset public, we will only make the tweet IDs themselves public, in
accordance with Twitter’s Tweet Rehydration Policy [13]. Digital regulation is
relatively immature, and we expect regulations to change and evolve to better
protect and inform people over the coming years. We seek to comply with the spirit




2.1 Data Archive Service
In order to archive large amounts of data, we rented an Amazon Web Services
(AWS) EC2 instance and a MySQL database on RDS for the duration of the study.
The EC2 instance ran a Python script as a cron job. The script hit the Twitter API
every fifteen minutes and downloaded tweets which matched the specified search
queries up to the rate limits. Refer to Appendix A for a list of search queries.
At a slightly lower-level, in addition to everything mentioned above, we also use S3
for object backup. On the development machine (locally): MongoDB and Python
pickles for object storage to disk. Saving data on a local disk makes a lot of sense,
as it allows us to avoid making expensive and slow queries over the network
repeatedly. Lawson discusses interesting work on Exascale computing which would
be relevant for an even larger data collection effort [14].
2.2 Datasets
There are three datasets in this research, two of which we build:
1. Senate Real-Time Dataset
2. Senate Retrospective Dataset
9
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Figure 2.1 High-level service overview
Figure 2.2 Detailed service overview
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3. 2015 Bot Challenge Dataset (BCD 2015) [3]
The following subsections will explain in more detail the methodology underlying
each of the three datasets.
2.2.1 Senate Real-Time Dataset
The only real-time Senate dataset of the study, this script ran as follows:
• Start Collection: October 14, 2018
• Stop Collection: December 10, 2018
• 5,426,083 tweets
• 947,099 unique twitter accounts
Important to note that this is first dataset was collected at the tweet level – it hits
the Twitter search API endpoint with the queries listed in Appendix A, up to but
not exceeding the free-tier dev limit. The data collection started as soon as we were
ready to run the tweet collector live.
11
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Figure 2.3 Real-Time Dataset API Query Types
Figure 2.4 Tweet volume over time – large spike is from the Nov. 6 elections
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Some candidates have national followings, for example Bernie Sanders, who also
happened to be up for election for the state of Vermont.
Looking at volume of tweets by Senate race.
13
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Figure 2.5 Most common words in tweet text, sorted by volume. These results
are intuitive and largely confirm our expectations; we are querying for candidate
names and we logically see the most popular candidates represented here, along with
common election-related words.
2.2.2 Senate Retrospective Dataset
Up to this point, the data downloaded has been at the tweet level. However, if we
are to detect bot accounts, we need contiguous selections of tweets from single
accounts in order to produce account profiles. Of the approximately 947,000
accounts captured in the real-time batch, we initially attempted to download a
sample of tweets from every account referenced in the real-time database. However,
that quickly proved infeasible due to rate limits, and would have taken more than a
year to complete. Thus, we determined that the next-best thing would be to pull a
random sample. As such, we pulled a random sample of 85,000 accounts from the
list of roughly 947,000 accounts present in the Senate realtime database.
In order to build the retrospective dataset, we used the GET statuses/user timeline
endpoint. The endpoint works as follows: it allows one to query for tweets in
reverse-chronological order starting from the current day and going back in time
until either:
• since id parameter, which we set to October 1, 2018, or




Figure 2.6 Post volume over time, represented as a timeseries. The volume of tweets
collected over time skews towards later timestamps due to API limitations. Tweet
volume is not increasing over time; volume of collected data clearly is. Many accounts
have tweeted frequently enough that their old tweets are no longer accessible. Despite
the skewed data collection, we can still notice two major spikes: 1) Election on Nov.
6, 2018 and 2) State of the Union on Feb. 5, 2019
The Senate retrospective job ran from February 26, 2019 - April 1, 2019, given the
rate limit constraints. At job completion, 128,210,831 tweets from 85,000 accounts
were archived, taking up over 800 gigabytes on disk. Because of the rate limits, the
download took months.
A significant artifact from the data collection process is visible in the chart. Many
of the accounts in the sample post frequently. If they post more than 3,200 times
between February 2019 and October 2018, the API will max out and stop giving
older tweets once we hit the cap. As a result, we have more tweet data in the datset
for later months, and less data corresponding to earlier months. So while it seems
like the volume of tweets over time is increasing, that is not the case. It just reflects
the distribution of the timestamps of the data contained in the database.
15
2.2 Datasets
Figure 2.7 Distribution of all-time total number of tweets, by account.
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Figure 2.8 Note that some accounts in the sample have zero tweets (and thus by
definition also zero retweets), they fall into the leftmost bar in the chart and have not
been filtered out from the visualization.
17
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Figure 2.9 Distribution of when Twitter accounts were created is fairly uniform,
except for an unexplained spike of accounts created around 2009
18
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2.2.3 2015 Bot Challenge Dataset (BCD 2015)
The third dataset comes from Professor V.S. Subrahmanian’s prior research. Several
university and corporate teams competed to detect a set of pro-vaccination Twitter
bots in the BCD 2015 dataset. Professor Subrahmanian led the team which won
first place at the competition with a near-perfect score. His winning team used a
semi-automated process, integrating inconsistency detection and behavioral
modeling, text analysis, network analysis, and machine learning to detect bots [3].
General BCD 2015 Statistics:
• 7,038 accounts, of which 39 are known pro-vaccination bots
• 4,095,083 tweets
• Network data
• The only thing we know is that those 39 accounts are bots. It does not follow
that the remaining accounts are not bots – they might also be bots.
2.3 Study Design
At a high-level, we do the following:
1. Generate HTML files of Twitter accounts, displaying profile information and a
selection of tweets from data and metadata stored in our database. The
Multi-page conditional form is based on the following template from
W3Schools.com [15].
2. Build a demographic survey, which annotators are required to take before they
can begin the annotation task.
3. Build a custom SageMaker labeling task, which shows annotators the HTML




Figure 2.10 Left: generated known bot html file from BCD 2015. Right: screenshot
of account as of May 2019, notice that it no longer exists. Interesting to note that the
profile image shown on the left is still being hosted on Twitter’s image servers, and
is accessible even today if you know the image URL to query for. You might expect
that Twitter would delete those assets to save space; we find that is (experimentally)
not always the case.
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2.3.1 Qualtrics Demographic Survey
We asked the following questions:
1. Study Consent ((yes), (no))
2. How old are you (numeric)
3. What is your gender? ((male), (female), (Nonbinary, genderqueer, or gender
non-conforming), (Prefer not to say))
4. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a? ((Strong Republican),
(Weak Republican), (Lean Republican), (Independent), (Lean Democrat),
(Weak Democrat), (Strong Democrat), (Other free-text), (Prefer not to say))
5. What is the highest level of education that you are currently enrolled in or
have obtained? ((High School), (Trade School), (Associate’s Degree),
(Undergraduate Degree), (Masters Degree), (Doctorate / PhD), (Prefer not to
say))
6. Do you use Twitter? If so, how frequently? ((Never), (Monthly), (Weekly),
(Daily), (Multiple times per day))
7. How many tweets have you posted within the last 30 days (including retweets)
((0 tweets), (Between 1 and 10 tweets), (More than 10 tweets))
8. How frequently do you read the news? ((Never), (Monthly), (Weekly),
(Daily), (Multiple times per day))
21
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9. How do you get your news? (click all that apply) (can select multiple) ((Print
Newspaper), (Magazines), (TV), (Computer / Smartphone / Internet), (Other
free-response), (Prefer not to say)
10. Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs:
((Rarely), (Sometimes), (Most of the time), (Almost always), (Prefer not to
say))
11. How would you define what a bot on Twitter is? (Free-text response)
12. What percentage of accounts on Twitter.com do you think are controlled by
bots? (select percentage between 0-100)
13. Do you think bots on Twitter are mostly helpful or mostly dangerous?
14. How helpful/dangerous do you think bots on Twitter are? ((A little helpful),
(Somewhat helpful), (Very helpful)) (conditional question based on previous
answer)
15. How are bots on Twitter helpful/dangerous (Free response)
16. How confident are you in your ability to identify bot accounts on Twitter?
((Not at all confident), (Somewhat confident), (Very confident))
17. Anything else you would like to add about bots on Twitter? (Free-response)
2.3.2 Labeling with Amazon SageMaker & Mechanical Turk
SageMaker Ground Truth offers the capability to run labeling jobs on three separate
types of labeling workforces: private workforce testing, MTurk public workforce
(what we used for real job launch), and “vendor” – higher-touch 3rd party services.
The generated HTML files do not contain profile photos because not all accounts in
the sample still have active profile photos still hosted on Twitter, and we wanted to
avoid biasing annotators towards or away from certain accounts due to the presence
or absence of a profile photo. Adding profile photo analysis (i.e. by building a
CNN) would be a great extension for future work.
22
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Figure 2.11 Page 1: Insert Survey ID Number after completing the Qualtrics Survey
Figure 2.12 Page 2: Task Instructions
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Figure 2.13 Page 3: Top of main page. Notice the iframe, which displays the Twitter
account as a nested HTML file
Figure 2.14 Page 3: Conditional form display – “Human” Selected
24
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• Public Health Bot




Figure 2.16 Page 4: optional meta-feedback field (Refer to Appendix B for the list
of responses to this question)
2.3.3 Study Launch
We were provided a study budget, and our objective was to maximize the number of
accounts analyzed in the study without going over budget. We decided to run 3
annotators per account to get a sense of inter-rater reliability, and we decided to
pay annotators $.036/account for 90 seconds of their time, quantity of time chosen
based on user testing with peers. We knew we would include all 39 bot accounts
26
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from BCD 2015, and we included 117 additional not-known-bot accounts from BCD
2015 for comparison. Our budget thus allowed us to include 1500 additional
accounts from the Senate retrospective dataset. To that effect, we scanned through
the randomly-selected accounts in our database until we generated 1500 accounts as
follows: a total of 1599 accounts were selected randomly, of which 1500 senate
accounts (93.87%) passed the filter and were analyzed by MTurkers. One empty
(deleted) account was manually included as an experiment, overriding the filter, as
an experiment in seeing how annotators would respond to a blank account.
The 98 accounts which did not pass the thresholds were filtered out according to the
following methodology:
• 41 blank accounts (2.56%) (either deleted or made private)
• 57 non-English accounts (3.56%) (defined as where <20% of tweets in an
account with more than 10 tweets were in English)
Thus, the study consisted of 1,657 total accounts:
• 1501 accounts out of the 85,000 Senate Dataset accounts
• 156 accounts from BCD 2015 (25% known bots, 75% unknown type)




We launched the SageMaker+Qualtrics study on Sunday, May 12th, and the study
completed in less than 15 hours. Analysis of the results follows below.
3.1 Qualtrics Demographic Survey Results
• 980 survey respondents
• Mean age: 34.8
• 55% Female, 41% Male
28
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Figure 3.1 Most frequent words in response to the Qualtrics free-text question:
“How would you define what a bot on Twitter is?”
Note that MTurk workers are not representative of the population at large, they
just represent a convenient launch point for a study such as this.
We asked individuals in the Qualtrics survey whether or not they believe bots to be
helpful or dangerous, and why, and the results to that question are below:
• 72.5% of respondents believe bots to be mostly dangerous. Below are the top
words in the bots-are-dangerous free-response:
29
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–
• 27.5% of respondents believe bots to be mostly helpful. Below are the top
words in the bots-are-helpful free response:
–
3.2 MTurk Annotation Responses
30
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Figure 3.2 Significant power-law drop-off in the number of responses that annotators
completed.
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3.3 Ground Truth Results on 39 known bots in
BCD 2015
Bot detection results on the known ground-truth BCD 2015 dataset
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3.3.1 Example BCD 2015 Account
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Figure 3.3 BCD Dataset: Tweets over time
Figure 3.4 BCD Dataset: Retweet distribution. Notice how many of the bot ac-
counts judiciously position themselves in the middle of the distribution, avoiding the
high-end of the chart, in contrast with what MTurk labelers believe bots look like.
34
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3.4 Senate Dataset Bot Detection
We write analysis code in Python which allows us to pass in any two lists of Twitter
account ids and generate summary statistics and dual-trace charts as output. We
develop a negative-15-to-positive-15 confidence score plot. Negative 15 means all
three annotators each clicked on “Human” with a confidence of 5, thus (-1)*3*5 =
-15. Positive 15 means that all three annotators each clicked on “Bot” with
confidence scores of 5 each, hence (1)*3*5 = 15. We plotted the distributions, refer
to the following charts. Then, we pick two arbitrary threshold levels to split the two
classes at:
1. A threshold set at greater than or equal to “2/3 Bot” vote gives us 358
believed-to-be-bot accounts, or 23.87% of the 1500 senate-account sample.
2. An even higher standard, an 11/15 confidence gives us 87 believed-to-be-bot
accounts , or 5.8% of the 1500 senate-account sample.
Recall that these percentages are based on our dataset, which is skewed towards
political accounts. These percentages do not generalize beyond this sample. The
following charts visualize a split at the 11/15 bot confidence threshold, but many
other threshold lines are of course also possible.
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Figure 3.5 Plotting the arbitrary choice of a 11/15 bot/not-bot split
Figure 3.6 Accounts from the Senate retrospective dataset which tweet more fre-
quently are more likely to be perceived by MTurk annotators to be bots. We don’t
know if this is a correct judgement, only that it is a judgement they are making.
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Figure 3.7 Accounts that tweet more frequently are more likely to be perceived to
be bots by MTurkers. Note that due to API limitations almost 35% of accounts have
so many tweets that we were unable to collect data on them going back all the way
to October, hence why so many cap out around 3,000 tweets.
Figure 3.8 Accounts which retweet more frequently are more likely to be perceived
to be bots by the MTurk annotators. Also notable: the spike of accounts which never
retweet or have zero tweets (chart includes the accounts which were deleted or made
private)
37
3.4 Senate Dataset Bot Detection
3.4.1 Example Account from Senate Dataset
To be very clear – we do not know if this is a bot. It may just be a partisan who




A few remarks regarding future work: with only 39 known ground-truth bots in the
dataset, it would be interesting to have more people look at the same accounts, or
incorporate other known ground-truth datasets. We would not want a hypothetical
bot detector system in production falsely accusing accounts of being bots.
Possible improvements to MTurk Labeling Task going forward include:
1. Incorporate profile images, inline media, conversations between accounts
2. Add graph network features (although Twitter rate limits make this hard)
3. Pay for more than just 90 seconds per Twitter account
4. Increase the number of coders per account (5, 7, or 9 instead of just 3)
Improvements to the Data Archive Service:
1. account-level real-time collection





(b) number of tweets
(c) political affiliation
Going forward, it will be interesting to investigate the effects of partisanship, as well
as demographic characteristics on how they affect human tendency to judge
accounts as bots or humans. Furthermore, it would be interesting to apply more
advanced NLP – bag-of-words analysis only scratches the surface. As a next step,
incorporating the “bot subtype” data into a multi-class classifier would be an
interseting extension to this work. This dataset and this research opens doors for
more collaboration across both Computer Science and Political Science.
Future work:
• Improve collection methodology (pull full profiles in real-time, larger sample,
more search keywords)
• Improve MTurk survey interface (add profile images, add inline media, add
conversation context)
• Run an “analyst-style” job where we give MTurkers a much more robust set of
tools and features to look at (eg derived plots and graphs that they wouldn’t
otherwise see while browsing Twitter)
• Build a “what people think are bots” classifier
• Build a bot classifier
• Rerun identical task months or years later, to see if/how responses change
over time, see whether or not accounts are labeled again as bots, see if
accounts have been blocked or deleted themselves.





Bots are constantly changing. As soon as an academic builds an accurate bot
detector, botmakers can build bots designed to get around the new detectors, in a
never-ending sequence of cat versus mouse.
It is rarely clear what is human and what isn’t, especially to an untrained observer.
The ground truth results using the BCD 2015 dataset representing a humbling
reminder of how hard it can be to detect bots. Roughly a quarter were detected
(11/39); just as many flew under the radar of all three annotators.
When it comes to the Senate accounts, we observed earlier that the annotators in
this study were more likely to believe that a high-frequency posting, high percentage
of retweets out of total number of tweets account is a bot. While this may be true,
there is a risk that annotators might just be demonizing the highest-visibility,
highest-frequency-posting people, and falsely caricaturing them as bots, when they
might actually just be partisans with different political opinions. Going forward, we
need to do additional NLP analysis of the actual tweet content in order to get a
better understanding of these accounts.
It is a small sample, and MTurk populations are known to be skewed, but
nevertheless it is an interesting snapshot into one particular batch of ground-truth
bots.
In summary: we learned that certain political candidates are discussed on Twitter
much more frequently than others. We learned that humans were not very good at
detecting these particular BCD 2015 bots. As a possible follow-up, we could provide
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the next iteration of annotators with more metadata and powerful analyst-style
charts to see what they could come up with when provided interactive visualizations
of different account data and metadata.
It is likely that we will discover additional attributes as we continue our analysis of
this dataset going forward. We want to avoid unintentionally building a detector
which simply flags highly-political accounts. Humans, not just bots, also express
polar (as well as moderate) political opinions, and it is important that we do not
inadvertently limit their freedom of speech by mischaracterizing them as bots.
We will conclude with two closing observations. First, we note that data collection
is not an implementation detail. Finally, we note that a model is only as good as its
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Appendix A
Twitter API Search Keywords
List of Twitter API search terms used to construct the real-time Senate database.
The @ username search only downloads tweets posted by the candidates themselves,
unlike the other two searches. ‘inc’ stands for ‘incumbent’.
Arizona Senate Race
Kyrsten Sinema (D) versus Angela Green (G) versus Martha McSally (R)













Dianne Feinstein (D inc) versus Kevin de Len (D)







Kevin de Len String
Connecticut Senate Race
Chris Murphy (D inc) versus Matthew Corey (R)









Tom Carper (D inc) versus Rob Arlett (R) versus Nadine Frost (L)











Bill Nelson (D) versus Rick Scott (R)











Mazie Hirono (D inc) Ron Curtis (R)









Joe Donnelly (D) versus Mike Braun (R)










Angus King (I inc) versus Zak Ringelstein (D) versus Eric Brakey (R)











Ben Cardin (D inc) versus Tony Campbell (R)










Elizabeth Warren (D inc) versus Shiva Ayyadurai (I) versus Geoff Diehl (R)













Debbie Stabenow (D inc) versus John James (R)









Minnesota (Special Election) Senate Race
Tina Smith (D inc) versus Karin Housley (R)









Amy Klobuchar (D inc) versus Jim Newberger (R)









Mississippi (Special Election) Senate Race
Cindy Hyde-Smith (R, inc) versus Mike Espy (D)









Roger F. Wicker (R inc) versus David Baria (D)










Claire McCaskill versus Josh Hawley









Jon Tester (D inc) versus Matt Rosendale (R)











Deb Fischer (R inc) versus Jane Raybould (D)









Dean Heller (R inc) versus Jacky Rosen (D)










New Jersey Senate Race
Bob Menendez (D inc) versus Bob Hugin (R)








New Mexico Senate Race
Martin Heinrich (D inc) versus Gary Johnson (I) versus Mick Rich (R)












New York Senate Race
Kirsten Gillibrand (D inc) versus Chele Chiavacci Farley (R)







Chele Chiavacci Farley String
North Dakota Senate Race
Heidi Heitkamp versus Kevin Cramer










Sherrod Brown (D inc) versus Jim Renacci (R)










Bob Casey Jr. (D inc) versus Lou Barletta (R)









Rhode Island Senate Race
Sheldon Whitehouse (D inc) versus Robert Flanders (R)









Phil Bredesen (D) versus Marsha Blackburn (R)










Ted Cruz (R inc) versus Beto O’Rourke (D)











Mitt Romney (R) versus Jenny Wilson (D)









Bernie Sanders (I inc) versus Lawrence Zupan (R)






Tim Kaine (D inc) versus Corey Stewart (R)









Maria Cantwell (D inc) versus Susan Hutchison (R)









West Virginia Senate Race
Joe Manchin (D inc) versus Patrick Morrisey (R)










Tammy Baldwin (D inc) versus Leah Vukmir (R)









John Barrasso (R inc) versus Gary Trauner (D)











Feedback on Labeling Task
Free-text responses from the survey’s optional Meta-feedback field. Responses such
as ’no’ and ’N/A’ were filtered out, but all substantive responses are shown below.
Figure B.1 Meta-feedback field
• no really no so much on politics
• Interesting task, but it will be somewhat limited. Could be a good filter to try
to weed out the most obvious bot acc.
• I’m going to stop here because I’m honestly not sure if I’m any good at this.
No wonder bots are such a problem, it’s really hard to tell.
• good expreinces
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• Thank you for the opportunity to participate.
• Having an actual screenshot of the account could help identifying if it’s a bot
or not.
• add some pictures will be fine
• very interestinge
• I am not seeing the 90 second timer. I’m not sure where it should be at. I
hope that I’m doing this right.
• The program didn’t catch a private account–no tweets to review.
• Need a button for private and deleted accounts.
• This might be a human, but if so, I think it’s a human that is being paid to
post several times a day.
• Pay’s a bit low considering the time you need to spend to answer this
thoughfully.
• This was an interesting task. Thank you!
• good hit.
• I am not seeing the 90 second timer, I feel either it isn’t there (which would be
a good thing) or fear I might get rejected hits because of this. I don’t want to
speed and rush my work , as I like to give the best work I can give. I do see a
60 minute timer, just wondering since it was in the instructions.
• Very Nice Survey.
• sisgnificant amount of infor to process in a subjective task
• good hit.
• There could be some guidelines to explain how to identify a bot
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• Can not evaluate because account has been deleted or is private
• thank you
• Twitter account was made private so I was unable to make a decision based on
account’s tweets.
• Nope. Keep up the good work!
• Great task
• no not at this time
• Thank you for this hit
• There is no 90 second timer as mentioned in the instructions. Would also be
helpful to see examples of bot accounts, and distinguish between bots and
spammers.
• I could not determine whether or not this user was a human or bot because
the account is suspended.
• the general observation box is usually redundant.
• I think I just did this one, unless I forgot to submit it the first time?
• again, the ”general observation” box is kind of a repetition
• Nope, looks good. Thanks!
• you should add an option for suspended accounts.
• Fun survey!
• add images if anyone is there.
• The tweets were protected. I made my best guess based on the meta data
available.
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• This was simple and easy to figure out of to complete.
• Might be good to try and sort by language.
• yes’, ’This account was apparently deleted, only a user name was left there.
• good survey
• Hardest one I’ve done yet because there were s little tweets to go off of and it
really seems like a bot but makes a few human-like statements. It was hard to
choose between bot and human.
• good survey
• Need to click at least one option to continue, no chat script.
• Great task, thank you.
• Thank you for this hit
• The tweets were protected. Unsure if they were an actual bot or not.
• Pro-democratic person
• It did not show their tweets on the page before. But I looked them up on
twitter and it showed them there.’...
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